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ANTITRUST-STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
ANTITRUST - MUNICIPALITIES AND THE STATE ACTION
EXEMPTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT-
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40 (1982).
Since 1966 Community Communications Co. has provided
cable television service to an area within the city of Boulder en-
compassing approximately 20% of the city's population. This ser-
vice was authorized by a 20-year, revocable, non-exclusive per-
mit granted pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the city council.1
The city's authority to enact such an ordinance is derived from
its status as a 'home rule' municipality, organized as such under
the Colorado State Constitution. The Home Rule Amendment to
this constitution grants "the people of all municipalities coming
within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local
and municipal matters ...... City charters and ordinances made
i furtherance of this authority supersede the laws of the state.3
Until 1979 limited technology and geographic conditions
restricted the services provided by the Communications Co. At
that time improved technology offered the company the capabili-
ty of expanding its services and the company notified the city of
its plans to do so. However, the new technology also presented
an occasion for potential competitors to enter the area and the
city chose to reevaluate its cable television policy. An emergen-
cy ordinance resulted, prohibiting the Communications Co. from
expanding its business for a period of three months. This time
period was to enable the city to enact a model cable television
ordinance and to give new competitors a chance to enter the
market. It was also felt that the emergency ordinance was
necessary to prevent the Communications Co.'s expansion from
discouraging potential competitors.4
The Communications Co. filed suit in District Court5 seek-
ing a preliminary injunction which would prohibit the city from
enforcing its ordinance. The company based its allegations on the
grounds that the ordinance violated the Sherman Act.6 The city
1. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). This permit
was originally granted to Colorado Televents, Inc. in 1964 and was assigned to Community Com-
munications in 1966. Id. at 44.
2. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. (quoted in City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 44 n.I).
3. Id.
4. 455 U.S. at 44-46.
5. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1980).
6. Id. at 1038. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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argued that under the Parker doctrine7 it was entitled to antitrust
immunity.' The District Court rejected this argument stating that
the Parker exemption did not apply according to City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.9 and granted the injunction. The
Court of Appeals reversed."0 That court distinguished City of
Lafayette in that the city here was not involved in any proprietary
activity and since the city's actions were the only 'state' involve-
ment as to supervision or statement of policy, it satisfied the criteria
for a Parker exemption.
The United States Supreme Court found that the central ques-
tion to be resolved was "whether a 'home rule' municipality,
granted by the state constitution extensive powers of selfgovern-
ment in local and municipal matters, enjoys the 'state action' ex-
emption from Sherman Act liability announced in Parker .... ""
The Court held that the city had not satisfied the requirements
developed under the Parker doctrine and thus was not entitled
to an exemption from the antitrust laws. It reversed judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 3
History of the State Action Exemption
That section of the Sherman Act applicable here reads in part
that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.""4
A literal reading of the phrase 'every contract' would lead to the
conclusion that all contracts, regardless of subject matter, terms,
provisions, etc., would violate the Act. Thus it is apparent that
some limitations on the application of the act were intended ac-
cording to the purpose for which it was enacted. However, there
is little legislative history from which to determine either what
limitations, if any, were envisioned, or the specific objectives of
this antitrust law. Therefore, in the 93 years since its enactment
there have been and are various positions as to the Act's objec-
7. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. 455 U.S. at 48-49. The city also argued that its actions were within its police powers,
but the district court responded that those powers only concerned local matters and that cable
television involved other concerns such as interstate commerce.
9. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
10. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
11. 455 U.S. at 40.
12. Id. at 43.
13. Id. at 57.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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tives and the application of the limitations which have been created
to restict it.' 5
One judicially created limitation is the state action exemp-
tion. Generally, this will apply when a state, in legitimate exer-
cise of its sovereign power, legislates conduct which may violate
the Sherman Act. 6 The exemption is essentially the result of a
conflict between two principles: the constitutional principle that
when a federal law conflicts with a state law, the federal law will
prevail versus the principle of federalism, which prescribes that
a state should be able to regulate its own economy. 7 When a con-
flict arises between an antitrust law and a state law a court must
determine whether it should imply a Congressional intent to defer
to the type of state act involved. 8 The state action exemption is
not an absolute rule- it involves an assessment of the proper rela-
tionship between the particular state act and its surrounding cir-
cumstances, and the antitrust law.' 9 What factors must be con-
sidered in making this assessment have been the subject of con-
troversy and the source of confusion since the exemption was first
recognized. While this note is limited to a review of the state ac-
tion exemption as applied to municipalities, it is necessary to
review the entire history of the exemption in order to gain a
perspective on the holding in City of Boulder.
The Parker case is credited with establishing the state action
doctrine. " At issue was a state law authorizing a marketing pro-
gram which restricted competition and maintained prices among
the growers, distributors and packers of raisins."' The program
was to be instituted by state officials and administered by a com-
mission appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state
senate. " Basing its decision on principles of federalism," the
15. See generally, S. OPPENHELM, G. WESTON, & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
(4th ed. 1981); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977).
16. S. OPPENHELM, G. WESTON, & MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 31 (4th ed.
1981).
17. Bricker, Municipal Liability: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 18 URB.
L. ANN. 265 (1980).
18. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 737 (1977).
19. Id. at 734.
20. It did so by drawing on the following language from Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332,
345 (1904) which concerned a state law regulating pilotage within Texas:
[I]f the state has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and commission,
those who are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly or
combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents
of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.
21. 317 U.S. at 346-7.
22. Id.
23. Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
518, 519 (1979).
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Supreme Court found that the Sherman Act was intended to pro-
hibit individual and not state action.2 ' While the program was pro-
posed and approved by individuals, it was the state which adopted
and enforced the program in execution of "governmental policy."
In emphasizing that the program concerned was authorized and
effectuated by legislative command and could not have operated
without that command, the Court stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government
in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not light-
ly attributed to Congress.26
However, the Court also warned that a state could not bestow
immunity on one who violated the Act by either authorizing them
to do so or by proclaiming their acts to be lawful.27
For over 30 years following Parker the Court refused to
review cases contesting the state action exemption and Parker
stood as the Court's sole guidance for application of the doctrine.28
This left the lower courts with little direction as to the scope of
the doctrine and a confusion of inconsistent and contradictory opin-
ions resulted." A reexamination of the doctrine began in 1975
and resulted in a line of seven state action cases, the most recent
being City of Boulder.
The first of these cases, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,3" con-
cerned a county bar association which published a minimum fee
schedule. 1 Enforcement of the schedule was provided by the
Virginia State Bar Association, an administrative agency through
which the Virginia Supreme Court regulated the practice of law. 2
In rejecting the state action exemption argument, it was found
that, according to Parker, the first inquiry which had to be made
when considering if a state's anticompetitive activity was exempt
was whether that activity was required by the state acting as
24. 317 U.S. at 352.
25. Id.
26. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
27. 317 U.S. at 351 (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332,
344-7 (1904).
28. Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
518, 519-20 (1979).
29. Comment, Municipal Liability: City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 18
UR. L. ANN. 265, 271 (1980).
30. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).




when considering if a state's anticompetitive activity was exempt
was whether that activity was required by the state acting as
sovereign.3 The fee schedule concerned was not the result of a
state law and while mentioned in the state's supreme court rules,
it was not mandatory.3" The Court added that it was insufficient
for an activity to be 'prompted' by state action - it must be 'com-
pelled' by the state acting as sovereign." Thus a condition of com-
pelling state action was imposed.
A year later the Court again looked at the exemption again
in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 36 There a privately owned elec-
tric company distributed free light bulbs to its customers. The
company's rates, which compensated for the omission of a charge
for the bulbs, had to be approved by the state's Public Service
Commission, through which the state regulated electric utilities.
No state authority had investigated or approved the light bulb pro-
gram and this program did not implement any state-wide policy.
The state's position was found to be one of neutrality and thus
insufficient to support the exemption."7 The opinion found that
Parker was limited to official action taken by the state, that Parker
did not consider a situation where the action involved was essen-
tially that of a private company, and so was not controlling8 The
Court did indicate that there might be situations where state par-
ticipation would be so dominant as to require exemption 9 and went
on to outline some of the previously proposed conditions. ' The
state action immunity claim was then rejected on the grounds that
the program involved did not meet the condition of being necessary
to make the states's regulation of public utilities work. 1 Thus
another condition for application of the exemption was created.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona"2 attempted refinement of
the exemption was continued. There the state supreme court, as
part of its regulation of the state bar, enforced a rule which
33. Id. at 790 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52).
34. 421 U.S. at 790.
35. Id. at 791.
36. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
37. Id. at 585.
38. Id. at 591-92.
39. Id. at 594-95.
40. Id. at 592-93 nn. 26-29. The court cited Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 346 (1904). (state authorization); Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (state approval); Goldfarb,
421 U.S. at 791 (state encouragement); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962) (state participation).
41. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597 & n. 34 (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 (1963)).
42. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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restricted advertising by attorneys."3 Goldfarb was distinguished
on the grounds that the action concerned in Bates was compelled
by the state supreme court as the ultimate state authority over the
practice of law." Cantor was also distinguished in that the action
in Bates was directed at the state, not a private company, and
regulation of the bar's activities was the central point of the state's
authority, not a limited association to the state's regulatory
authority.4" It was found that the Court's concern for unnecessary
and inappropriate subordination of federal policies was mini-
mized in this situation and that it considered it "significant that
the state policy [was] so clearly and affirmatively expressed and
that the state's supervision [was] so active."4 Thus the Court
clarified the point that the extent to which the exemption would
apply to governmental action would rest in large part on the type
of governmental decision involved.4" Bates, therefore, estab-
lished two new conditions for consideration -clearly and affir-
matively expressed state policy and active state supervision.
At this point the state action exemption cases had been con-
cerned only with action by the state itself or private parties in
some relationship to the state. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co.48 became the first case to consider whether the ex-
emption also applied to municipal action. In Lafayette it was
claimed that cities, given the power under state law to own and
operate an electric utility system, had committed various antitrust
violations. 9 The Court reviewed the history of the state action
exemption and stated that this review revealed a limitation by the
Parker decision to apply the exemption only to those programs
that were the direct result of a state command."0 The opinion found
that this limitation had been emphasized and had undergone fur-
ther refinement in Goldfarb (activity compelled by the state's act-
ing as sovereign) and Bates (clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy, active state supervision)." There was no
support for the proposition that a city itself is sovereign. Therefore,
to extend the doctrine to municipalities would conflict with the
43. Id. at 353.
44. Id. 359-60
45. Id. at 360-62.
46. Id. at 362.
47. Id. at 359-63 (discussing Parker, 317 U.S. 341; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773; Cantor, 428
U.S. 579).
48. 455 U.S. 389 (1978).
49. Id. at 391-92.
50. Id. at 409.
51. Id. at 410.
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established basis for the doctrine (state sovereignty resulting from
principles of federalism)."2
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal
deference of the states that create them. Parker's limitation of the exemp-
tion to 'official action directed by a state', is consistent with the fact that
the state's subdivisions generally have not been treated as equivalents of
the states themselves.5
The Court held that it was unwilling to find a blanket extension
of the state action exemption for anticompetitive activities by
municipalities. This did not mean that all municipal anticompetitive
activities would be subjected to the antitrust laws. ' Rather, "[i]t
only means that when the state itself has not directed or author-
ized an anticompetitive practice, the state's subdivisions in exer-
cising their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws.""5 Com-
ment was made that this holding would not affect the state's abili-
ty to delegate power or use municipalities to administer state
regulatory policies and that it would not affect the municipalities
ability to govern its inhabitants or provide services.5 6
That same term the Court also considered a state law which
provided that a motor vehicle manufacturer had to notify the state
Motor Vehicle Board of its intention to open a new retail dealer-
ship within an existing franchisee's market area. 7 Approval of
that Board had to be secured if the existing franchisee protested."
There was little discussion of the state action exemption in New
Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox, Co., as the
court found the question presented strictly one of law. 9 Parker,
Bates and Lafayette were cited in support of the holding that the
state law provided a "system of regulation, clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business
freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of
automobile dealerships. The regulation is therefore outside the
reach of the antitrust laws under the 'state action' exemption."60
Finally, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal
52. Id. at 411-12.
53. Id. at 411-12 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n. 12 (1974); Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351).
54. 435 U.S. at 413.
55. Id. at 416.
56. Id. at 415-16.
57. New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 98 (1978).
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id. at 109, n. 13.
60. Id. at 109.
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Aluminum, Inc. ,61 the Court again undertook the task of resolv-
ing the conflicts and confusions which had arisen from its previous
treatment of the state action exemption. Midcal concerned a state
law requiring all wine producers, wholesalers and rectifiers to
file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state.62 No wine
could be sold at other than the set price. 63 The state had no direct
control over the prices and did not review their reasonableness." '
Again the opinion contained a review of the state action exemp-
tion case history.65 This time it was found that previous cases had
established two conditions which had to be satisfied in order for
the Parker exemption to apply: 1) a clearly articulated and affir-
matively expressed state policy; and 2) active supervision of the
activity at issue by the state itself." While the wine pricing system
satisfied the first condition in that it was a forthrightly stated
legislative policy, it did not satisfy the second condition because
it simply authorized and enforced the price setting - it did not
establish the prices, review their reasonableness, monitor market
conditions, or reexamine the prices at appropriate intervals.67 The
opinion concluded by citing Parker for its support of the proposi-
tion that the national policy for competition could not be cir-
cumvented by "casting . . . a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.""
The City of Boulder Decision
In City of Boulder the Court again faced the question of the
applicability of the state action exemption to a municipality. As
in the previous state action decisions, a summary of the case law
on the exemption was discussed.69 The Court reached the conclu-
sion that these precedents, taken as a whole, could be synthe-
sized into two criteria, one inapplicable to a municipality and a
second which must be satisfied in order to entitle a municipality
to avail itself of the state action exemption.70
The first criterion is that an activity is not exempt unless it
61. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
62. Id. at 99.
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id. at 100.
65. Id. at 103-06, discussing Parker, 317 U.S. 341; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773; Cantor, 428
U.S. 579; Bates, 433 U.S. 350; Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389; and Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. 96.
66. 445 U.S. at 105.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 106.
69. 455 U.S. at 48-57.
70. Id. at 52.
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"constitutes the action of the [s]tate... itself in its sovereign
capacity."" This criterion is based on the Parker holding that there
is nothing in the Sherman Act that indicates it was intended to
restrain a state or its officers from actions directed by the
legislature." As to whether the word 'state' included municipalities
and subdivisions of the state, the Court simply quoted from and
reiterated its holding in Lafayette to the effect that cities are not
sovereign, treated as the equals of a state, or included as sovereigns
within the principles of federalism."3
Although a municipality will be unable to satisfy this first
criterion it does not follow that a municipality is automatically
subjected to the scrutiny of the Sherman Act. It is still possible
for a municipality to gain immunization from antitrust liability
if the activity in question "constitutes municipal action in fur-
therance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy."' Although Bates is not relied on by the
Court, this standard was first expressed in that case,' later reex-
amined in Lafayette,' and adopted in Orrin Fox,"' and Midcal. 8
Again, reliance was simply placed on the language and reason-
ing of the Lafayette opinion for support of this second criterion,
and it was stated that this criterion was merely a "recognition that
a state may choose to effectuate its policies through the instrumen-
tality of its cities and towns," leading to the conclusion that some
protection must be offered.' 9
In establishing these two criteria, no new reasoning for or
insight into the criteria was offered nor was additional clarifica-
tion provided for application of the criteria to a municipality. This
opinion was essentially a 'codification' of previous case law. And
because the city did not satisfy the second criterion as required,
the Court deemed it unnecessary to consider whether the active
state supervision condition also had to be satisfied in order for
the exemption to apply. Thus it refused to discuss a condition
which it found to be an underlying basis for its decision in Bates,
later described in Lafayette, and relied upon in Midcal. 8 Indeed,
this opinion was basically confined to the narrow question of
71. Id.
72. Id. at 54 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 52.
75. 433 U.S. at 362.
76. 435 U.S. 389 at 410.
77. 439 U.S. 96 at 105.
78. 445 U.S. 97 at 105.
79. 455 U.S. at 51.
80. Id. at 51, n. 14.
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whether the 'home rule' municipality satisfied either criterion under
the facts presented.
The city's first contention was that the Home Rule Amend-
ment vested the city with all powers previously held by the
legislature in regard to municipal matters. Since regulation of cable
television within the city limits is a local concern, the city was
acting as the state in regulation of a local matter. This argument
was rejected by a finding that Parker and the subesquent state
action cases which followed all stood for the proposition that the
principle of federalism was limited in that our dual system of
government contained no place for sovereign cities. This proposi-
tion was found to have been recognized in Lafayette and reaf-
firmed in Orrin Fox and Midcal. Thus without delving into the
exact status of a home rule municipality in relation to the state,
the court found that no municipality of any type is sovereign.
Therefore, it cannot avail itself of the first criterion.81
Consideration was then given to the city's argument that the
second criterion of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy was satisfied because within the grant of local
autonomy the state comprehended the inclusion of the city's power
to enact the challenge ordinance. This led to the conclusion that
the state 'contemplated' the city's action. The Court stated that ac-
ceptance of this contention would obviate the need for the require-
ment of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy. Echoing its language in Cantor it stated that the state's
relationship to the challenged ordinance was one of neutrality in
that a general grant of powers cannot be said to 'contemplate' a
specific anticompetitive ordinance. Therefore, the second criterion
was not fulfilled. Thus a home rule grant of general power by
the state to the municipality will be insufficient to immunize the
municipality from Sherman Act liability unless there is an indepen-
dent, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy
on the challenged activity."
The response to the city's final argument that denial of the
exemption would have a grave effect on all municipalities was
that this was simply another attack on the long-standing national
policy of committment to free competition. Again returning to
its language in Lafayette, the opinion stated that this holding would
not impair the state's ability to allocate power, nor would it pro-
hibit a city from providing necessary services for its inhabitants.
81. Id. at 53-54.
82. Id. at 54.
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Thus the entire opinion is in essence a restatement of prior deci-
sions concerning the state action exemption.8
Justice Rehnquist's dissent centered on what he considered
two serious 'flaws' in the majority's opinion. His first concern was
that the majority phrased its issue as one of a municipality's 'ex-
emption' from the Sherman Act.8" He stated that the question was
not one of exemption, but "whether statutes, ordinances, and
regulations enacted as an act of government are preempted by the
Supremacy Clause.""5 His second concern was that the majority,
in holding that a municipality is entitled to an exemption only if
it satisfies the requirement of a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy, had placed a municipality on the same
footing as any privately owned business.86 This, he found, would
"radically alter the relationship between the States and their
political subdivisions."87 A city's ability to regulate its economy
will be nonexistent without a clearly expressed state policy to that
affect.88 This will essentially destroy the home rule movement
because in a home rule situation the state has disabled itself from
articulating the necessary state policy.89 In order to avail itself
of the state action exemption, the home rule municipality will have
to return its hard-won authority to the state.9 In Justice Rehn-
quist's words "[iut is unfortunate enough that the Court today holds
that our Federalism is not implicated when municipal legislation
is invalidated by a federal statute. It is nothing less than a novel
and egregious error when this Court uses the Sherman Act to
regulate the relationship between the states and their political
subdivisions. "91
Analysis
The holding in City of Boulder emerges as a finding that when
application of the state action exemption to a municipal activity
is at issue, the Court will examine that issue from the same view-
point as it would if determining whether an activity engaged in
by a private individual or business is eligible for the exemption.
Thus, in order to determine the status of the state action exemp-
83. Id. at 56-57.
84. Id. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 70.
88. Id.
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tion as applied to a municipality, it is necessary to determine the
status of the exemption as a whole.
At the time Parker was decided it was considered to stand
for the broad proposition that acts which were attributed to the
state in implementation of a governmental policy were not sub-
ject to the Sherman Act.92 This brief treatment had two results:
1) it provided little guidance for the lower courts and produced
a confusion of disparate rationales and holdings;93 and 2) it pro-
vided little substance when the Court undertook its examination
of the area in 1975. This lack of guidance by the Court is not
restricted to the Parker opinion. While the opinions since 1975
have determined whether the particular challenged activity in ques-
tion was eligible for the exemption, they did little to clarify or
delineate those conditions which must be satisfied for the exemp-
tion to be available to a party, private or municipal.
In the first case subsequent to Parker, Goldfarb, the Court
immediately began to limit the Parker holding. Goldfarb found
that activities not required by the state's acting as sovereign were
not covered by the exemption. Even if an activity passed this test,
it was implied that there could be other conditions which had to
be met.9" Cantor contributed to the limitation process by stating
that the Parker holding was clearly restricted to official action
taken by state officials.9" This decision also added to the surround-
ing confusion when five justices found that Parker applied to
private as well as state activities.9 The groundwork for further
conditions, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy and active state supervision, was laid in Bates.97 Tighter
limitations were found in Lafayette, which denied extension of
the exemption to a municipality and which restricted the Parker
doctrine to those activities for which there was direct legislative
mandate regardless of whether the party concerned was a sub-
division of the state or a private business. Lafayette also added
to the confusion by providing another possible condition which
the challenged activity may have to satisfy -and by failing to
92. Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws. 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974).
93. Handler, ANTITRUST-1978. 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1374-75 (1978).
94. 421 U.S. at 788.
95. 428 U.S. at 591.
96. This essentially disregards the distinctions between the two types of activities and is
possibly the forerunner of the holding in City of Boulder.
97. 433 U.S. at 362.
[Vol.3:135
ANTITRUST-STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
clarify exactly which condition is appropriate." The dissent in
that case also suggested the direction of the holding in City of
Boulder when it stated that requiring a legislative mandate for
a municipal activity would "blur, if indeed it does not erase," the
distinctions between private and governmental actions." The two
conditions proposed in Bates were also accepted by the Court in
Lafayette and were reaffirmed in Orrin Fox, where the brief treat-
ment of the exemption seems to indicate that the law in this area
is settled. Midcal retains these two conditions but also adds to
the confusion by failing to provide objective criteria by which
the active state supervision requirement can be judged.
City of Boulder has clearly continued this trend of limitation
of the state action doctrine by placing the municipality on par with
a private party. From "actions of a state acting as sovereign" ,"oo
the doctrine has been reduced to only those activities by any par-
ty which are directly mandated by the state. While there was some
room for argument as to the applicability of the doctrine to
municipalities under Lafayette in that that opinion was a plurality
decision, the Court appears to have solidified its approach since
that time with Orrin Fox, Midcal, and City of Boulder all receiv-
ing majority votes. However, City of Boulder also continues the
trend of confusion in this area by refusing to consider whether
the condition of active state supervision should be added as a third
criterion. What appeared to be established in Midcal is now a ques-
tion of uncertainty, resulting in a delay before a point central to
the application of the doctrine can be clarified. Once again the
lower federal courts, the states, and the municipalities are left with
no choice but to follow the latest opinion until 'their' case gives
the Court the opportunity to reexamine the state action doctrine.
Conclusion
The resulting effects of a holding which places a municipali-
ty on the same footing as a private party raise serious questions
as to the soundness of the holding. The Court did not consider
the issue of appropriate remedies to be extracted from municipal
officials. The Sherman Act'01 requires that one injured by viola-
tion of the antitrust laws shall recover treble damages. In Lafayette
98. 435 U.S. at 415. The other three possibilities are the "compulsion" standard, Goldfarb,
421 U.S. at 790; the "approval" standard, Cantor, 428 U.S. at 596-7; and the "authorization"
standard, Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
99. 435 U.S. at 431 (Stewart, I., dissenting).
100. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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damages claimed were 180 million dollars which trebled would
equal 540 million in damages to be collected from cities with a
combined population of 75,000.02 Collection of an award of this
amount would place an unreasonable burden on a city who might
be left with the problem of who is to pay -the municipal officials
actually involved or the taxpayers, either on a pro rata basis or
through tax increases.
Another problem resulting from this decision concerns the
manner in which a municipality operates. Those who act pursuant
to a home rule or implied power doctrine will be hard-pressed
under their general grant of powers to find a specific legislative
command while those municipalities operating under a specific
enabling act will have evidence of the state's policy.10 This sup-
ports the dissent's argument that the majority's holding will alter
the relationship between a state and its subdivisions.
Also, while it has been established that a municipality may
socialize or monopolize some activities such as school systems,
fire departments, and police departments without violation of the
antitrust laws, this has been done on grounds of natural monopo-
ly or special relationship to the quality of the life of its
inhabitants.!0 Who will make the decision as to whether
monopolization of garbage collection or an ambulance service is
so related to the quality of life of a city's inhabitants that it will
not be subjected to the scrutiny of antitrust laws?
There are other effects to be considered. Subjecting
municipalities to the stringent standards found in the majority's
opinion will also permit the federal courts to conduct a far-ranging
inquiry into the reasonableness of a state's policies and will
discourage municipalities from attempting new and innovative
social and economic programs.o5 And if active state supervision
is found to be a condition which must be satisfied for the exemp-
tion to apply, will the courts require the state to supervise en-
forcement of a municipal ordinance?"4 Finally, denial of the ex-
emption will surely increase the number of cases involving
municipalities in alleged violation of the antitrust laws.
These questions and problems support the conclusion that the
Court's holding, which places a municipality on equal footing with
102. 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
103. Note, the Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
518, at 528 (1979).
104. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 739 (1977).
105. 435 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. 455 U.S. at 71 n. 6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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a private party in determining application of the state action ex-
emption, is too restrictive. They also lead to the determination
that a separate standard should be evolved for applying this ex-
emption to a municipality rather than using the standard applicable
to a private party. Various arguments to reinforce these conclu-
sions can be found from Parker and its statement that "we have
no question of the state or its municiplities becoming a
participant .. ,7 which implies that the court there considered
the state and its municipalities to be on an equal basis, to the dis-
sent in City of Boulder and a broad range of points in between.
While a blanket exemption for a municipality is not advocated,
reducing a governmental entity, such as a municipality, to the
status of a private party can produce nothing but continued con-
flict and confusion in this area of antitrust law. Thus a separate,
less restrictive, standard is advocated.
Charlene Robb Pierce
107. 317 U.S. at 351.
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